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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff and Appellee, ] 
v. 
JOHNHOLDEN, ) 
Defendant and Appellant. ) 
) Case No. 970236-CA 
i Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT 
Appeal from the Judgment and Order of Commitment 
Eighth District Court 
Uintah County, State of Utah 
Honorable A. Lynn Payne, Judge 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
John Holden, Defendant and Appellant, through counsel, appeals his conviction following 
conditional no contest pleas to one count of possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine, 
a second degree felony (enhanced), and one count of possession of a controlled substance, marijuana, 
a third degree felony (enhanced). The Court has jurisdiction in this case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(e). 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Issue 1 
Did the trial court err in denying defendant's motion to suppress a police videotape obtained 
from warrantless, surreptitious surveillance on his home by means of an unattended camera located 
inside a private home across the street? Standard of review: The court's denial presents a question 
of law, to be reviewed for correctness. State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229, 1232 (Utah 1996). 
Issue 2 
Did the trial court err in denying defendant's motion to suppress all evidence discovered in 
two bags seized by police subsequent to videotaping defendant taking the bags from a vehicle on his 
property and placing them near the street, on grounds that the evidence is fruit of the poisonous tree 
or in the alternative that defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the bags that police 
violated? Standard of review: The court's denial presents a question of law, to be reviewed for 
correctness. State v. Anderson, supra. 
Issue 3 
Did the trial court err in denying defendant's motion to suppress all evidence discovered in 
the bags on separate grounds that police acted in bad faith and failed to preserve certain items of 
evidence in the bags, in particular mail and food cans and packaging material, that were potentially 
useful to defendant in his case? Standard of review: The court's denial presents a question of law, 
to be reviewed for correctness. State v. Anderson, supra. 
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. 
STATUTES. ORDINANCES AND RULES 
Fourth Amendment, United States Constitution 
Fourteenth Amendment, United States Constitution 
Article I, section 7, Utah Constitution 
Article I, section 14, Utah Constitution 
Rule 16, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
The State, in its Second Amended Information, charged defendant with six counts: (1) 
possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine, on October 22, 1995 (enhanced to a first 
degree felony), (2) possession of a controlled substance, cocaine, on October 22, 1995 (enhanced to 
a first degree felony), (3) possession of paraphernalia on October 22, 1995 (enhanced to a class A 
misdemeanor), (4) possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine, on October 23, 1995 
(enhanced to a first degree felony), (5) possession of a controlled substance, marijuana, on October 
23, 1995 (enhanced to a third degree felony), and (5) possession of paraphernalia on October 23, 
1995 (enhanced to a class A misdemeanor). 
B. Course of Proceedings 
Preliminary hearing was held August 9, 1996. At that time, count six, possession of 
paraphernalia on October 22,1995, was dismissed. Defendant was bound over on all other counts„ 
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From facts adduced at preliminary hearing defendant subsequently moved the court to 
suppress certain evidence, specifically a police videotape obtained from surveillance on his home and 
all evidence found in two bags which defendant, while being videotaped, took from a vehicle on his 
property and placed near the street. Two arguments were raised with respect to the bags: that the 
contents of the bags are fruit of the poisonous tree, and that defendant had a privacy interest in the 
bags that police violated. The argument also was raised that evidence discovered in defendant's 
house on October 23, 1995, on the basis of a warrant issued after search of the bags, constitutes fruit 
of the poisonous tree. The trial court denied defendant's motion. More particularly, the court found 
that police did nothing illegal in videotaping defendant's home and they did not violate any privacy 
interest in the bags. The fruit of the poisonous tree argument regarding the bags was dealt with only 
implicitly. That is, because there is no poisonous tree (illegal police videotaping), there is no tainted 
fruit (evidence in the bags discovered from videotaping). The fruit of the poisonous tree argument 
regarding evidence found in defendant's home was really not dealt with at all. 
Believing the issues raised to be significant, defendant petitioned the Utah Supreme Court for 
permission to appeal the trial court's interlocutory order. On January 23, 1997 the court denied the 
petition. 
The case was set for trial. A month before trial, after repeated attempts to obtain full and 
complete discovery, defendant learned for the first time that police had failed to preserve certain 
evidence in the bags that would have been potentially useful to him. Defendant again moved the 
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court to suppress all evidence in the bags, this time on grounds that police violated his due process 
rights. A hearing was held March 14, 1997 to take evidence and argue the issue, as well as consider 
miscellaneous pre-trial matters. At the end of the hearing, the trial court denied defendant's motion. 
Later that same day, a plea agreement was entered into. 
C. Disposition at Trial Court 
Defendant pleaded no contest to two counts: (1) possession of a controlled substance, 
methamphetamine, on October 22, 1995 (enhanced to a second degree felony because of one 
previous drug-related offense), and (2) possession of a controlled substance, marijuana, on October 
23, 1995 (enhanced to a third degree felony because of two previous drug-related offenses). 
Defendant was sentenced respectively to one to fifteen years in prison and a $1,000 fine and zero to 
five years in prison and a $1,000 fine, the prison terms to run concurrently (though consecutively to 
a separate prison term he already was serving). Finally, defendant reserved the right to appeal the 
trial court's denial of suppression motions. 
RELEVANT FACTS 
On the afternoon of October 20, 1995, while investigating suspected drug activity, two 
members of the Vernal City Police Department installed a video camera and recorder inside a private 
home across the street from defendant's home, so that they surreptitiously could record the activities 
of defendant and anyone visiting him. Videotaping lasted fifty-two hours, until October 22nd. 
Equipment was unattended except for two brief checks. Police neither applied for nor received court 
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authorization for installation of equipment. Preliminary Hearing Tr. 6-8, 29-32. 
While picking up equipment on the evening of October 22nd, and while it still was operating, 
police observed defendant exit his home, take two opaque bags out of a vehicle on his property and 
place them near the street. Police decided to seize the bags. They did not do so immediately but 
waited four hours, until 10:30 p.m. that night. They searched the bags at police headquarters. 
Incriminating evidence was discovered. The next day, October 23rd, police obtained a warrant to 
search defendant's home and promptly executed it. Still more incriminating evidence was found. 
Defendant was arrested and charged. Tr. 7-22. 
The search of the bags at police headquarters took just thirty minutes. Police separated 
"evidence" from what they considered to be "trash" and threw the latter away. Among items thrown 
away were mail supposedly addressed to defendant and food cans and packaging materials. 
Defendant, in discovery requests, had asked for disclosure of all physical evidence seized from him, 
but police did not inform defendant of their failure to preserve certain items in the bags taken from 
his home until just one month before scheduled trial. Hearing Tr. 11-26. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Federal case law sets forth requirements for video surveillance on citizen's homes including 
the exterior. One such requirement is issuance of a court warrant authorizing surveillance. Police 
failed to meet this requirement, among others. They also recorded defendant's activities from a place 
where the general public inherently had no right to be. Police therefore violated defendant's 
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reasonable expectation of privacy against warrantless, surreptitious surveillance on his home from a 
non-public vantage point. Defendant's privacy interest is found in both the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution and article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution. The proper 
remedy for violation of defendant's rights is suppression of the police videotape. 
All evidence discovered in the two bags also should be suppressed. The evidence is fruit of 
the poisonous tree. State attenuation analysis supports suppression. Furthermore, because police 
had no way of knowing that the bags contained garbage, California v. Greenwood and State v. 
Jackson are not controlling. That is, the bags do not constitute garbage left for collection outside of 
the curtilage of a home, and accordingly police had no right to seize the bags and search them in the 
first place. In the alternative, if the bags are considered to be garbage, defendant had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the bags stemming from article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution. 
Jackson incorrectly has decided the issue. There are unique historical reasons why appellate courts 
in this jurisdiction should afford citizens greater expectation of privacy in garbage than Greenwood 
does. 
In addition, all evidence found in the bags should be suppressed because police failed to 
preserve certain evidence potentially useful to defendant. Mail supposedly addressed to defendant 
and food cans and packaging material bore on the central issue of defendant's constructive possession 
of the bags. Also, police acted in bad faith in destroying evidence. The burden of preservation, in 
written or photographic form, was minimal. Police acted speedily, too speedily, in violation of 
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defendant's due process rights. Police otherwise manifested bad faith in their actions. The proper 
remedy is suppression of evidence in the bags, on this ground if not other grounds, supra. 
ARGUMENT 
I. FEDERAL CASE LAW SETS FORTH REQUIREMENTS 
FOR POLICE VIDEO SURVEILLANCE ON CITIZENS' 
HOMES INCLUDING THE EXTERIOR; DEFENDANT 
HAD AN EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY THAT SOCIETY 
IS PREPARED TO RECOGNIZE AS REASONABLE; 
POLICE VIOLATED DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO BE 
FREE FROM UNREASONABLE SEARCHES UNDER 
BOTH THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND 
THE UTAH CONSTITUTION; THE POLICE VIDEOTAPE 
OBTAINED FROM SURVEILLANCE ON DEFENDANT'S 
HOME PROPERLY SHOULD BE SUPPRESSED. 
Defendant raises what appears to be an issue of first impression in this jurisdiction: Did 
warrantless, surreptitious videotaping of the defendant's home by police violate his constitutional 
rights, and should the police videotape obtained be suppressed in criminal proceedings against him? 
The following facts were adduced at defendant's preliminary hearing. Police, suspecting 
defendant of illegal activity, decided to conduct surveillance on his home. Preliminary Hearing Tr. 
6,1. 21 to Tr. 7,1.2. Police utilized a time lapse video recorder. Tr. 7,11. 4-5. Equipment was set 
up inside a neighbor's house directly across the street from where defendant lived. Tr. 29,1. 22 to 
Tr. 30,1. 2. The view was such that police were able to videotape vehicles arriving at and leaving 
defendant's home, as well as pedestrian traffic there. Tr. 7, 11. 13-17. Police also were able to 
videotape defendant engaging in activity in his yard. Tr. 7,1. 23 to Tr. 8,1. 2. Videotaping occurred 
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continuously, day and night, for a period of fifty-two hours. Tr. 30,1. 23 to Tr. 31,1. 4. Equipment 
was unattended, except for two brief checks to see if it was operating properly. Tr. 31,1. 11 to Tr. 
32,1. 7. Police intended videotaping to be surreptitious, that is, without defendant's knowledge. Tr. 
32,11.7-14. Police did not obtain court authorization before installation of equipment. Tr. 32,11. 15-
17. 
Citing the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, article I, section 14 of the 
Utah Constitution, and applicable federal case law, defendant subsequently moved to suppress the 
police videotape. The trial court denied defendant's motion, writing, 'The Court has read the cases 
sided [sic] by the Defendant and is not persuaded that the Defendant has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy which would require a warrant. The cases cited by the Defendant are factually distinguishable 
in that they relate to situations where the recordings where [sic] of areas that where [sic] not open 
to the public. In this case the police merely recorded on tape what was open to public view. The 
police certainly had a right to be in the place where the camera was set up. They could have stationed 
an officer at that location, where he or she could have observed the activities which took place at the 
Defendants [sic] home. The fact that a video recording was stationed at the location rather than a 
police officer has no constitutional significance. The use of recording equipment merely relieves an 
officer from the substantial time commitment which would have been involved in having an officer 
personally observe the Defendant's home. The constitution does not protect as private what a citizen 
knowingly open to public view." See Attachment A. 
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Defendant, in response, believes first that the trial court has misread cases that he has cited. 
Suppression of surreptitious police videotaping does not hinge upon whether videotaping did or did 
not take place in an area "open to public view." See United States v. Cuevas-Sanchez, 821 F.2d 248 
(5th Cir. 1987). In Cuevas-Sanchez federal agents applied for a court order authorizing video 
surveillance of the exterior of a private home where suspected drug trafficking was taking place. One 
reason given on the application, as required by United States v. Biasucci, 786 F.2d 504 (2nd Cir. 
1986), cert denied, 479 U.S. 827 (1986) and United States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875 (7th Cir. 1984), 
cert, denied, 470 U.S. 1087 (1985), was that conventional investigative techniques had failed. Agents 
received authorization and placed a camera on a utility pole overlooking a fence at the back of the 
property. Videotaping provided evidence of drug activity. Cuevas, charged in district court, moved 
to suppress the government videotape. The court denied the motion. Cuevas was convicted of 
possession of marijuana with intent to distribute and, on appeal, raised the suppression issue. Id. at 
249-50. 
The court of appeals affirmed Cuevas' conviction. However, it rejected the government's 
argument that court authorization for video surveillance was unnecessary in the first place because 
Cuevas had no reasonable expectation of privacy, as activity outside his house was exposed to public 
view. While there was a ten-foot metal fence on the north side of the property, there was just a five-
to six-foot metal fence on the east with a chain link fence on the west. There was no fence on the 
south, where the house faced. Thus, activity in the yard, both front and rear, was plainly visible from 
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the street or near the lower metal and chain link fences. The appeals court also noted, with some 
irony, that the government could not claim on the one hand that normal surveillance techniques had 
failed, one reason given for the need for videotaping, and on the other hand that suspected illegal 
activity on Cuevas' property was open to public view and therefore court authorization for 
videotaping was not required. Id. at 250. Clearly, Cuevas-Sanchez stands for the proposition that 
traditional Fourth Amendment analysis applies even when police videotape activity outside a citizen's 
home. More specifically, police must receive court authorization prior to surreptitious video 
surveillance, absent exigent circumstances or some other recognized exception. 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, in United States v. Mesa-Rincon, 911 F.2d 1433 (10th 
Cir. 1990), cited Biasucci, supra, Torres, supra, and Cuevas-Sanchez, supra and adopted five 
requirements for valid domestic video surveillance. Mesa-Rincon, generally, at 1439-45. The 
requirements are: (1) presentation of a probable cause affidavit to the court where authorization is 
sought, (2) issuance of a warrant authorizing surveillance, specifying the place to be put under 
surveillance, the type of activity sought to be intercepted, and the identity of the person committing 
the offense, (3) a statement on the warrant as to why conventional investigative techniques have failed 
or would be inappropriate, (4) use of minimization procedures (e.g. the ability to turn off equipment) 
so that non-specified activity and non-specified persons are not intercepted, avoiding an impermissible 
general search, and (5) surveillance for a time-limited period, not to exceed thirty days without 
reapplication to the court. 
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On the basis of the federal case law cited, defendant believes that police violated his Fourth 
Amendment right against unreasonable searches. In particular, police failed to apply to an Eighth 
District Court judge for authorization to conduct surreptitious video surveillance on defendant's 
home. No judge issued a warrant authorizing videotaping. There never was a showing that 
videotaping was necessary because conventional investigative techniques had failed or were 
inappropriate. Also, no effort was made to minimize the intrusiveness of videotaping and avoid a 
general search, in that police equipment operated continuously and without anyone in attendance 
except for two brief checks. The protection of the Fourth Amendment is of course applied to state 
action under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Defendant also believes, even in the absence of state case law 
on point, that police violated his rights under article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution. Defendant 
can have no less protection under article I, section 14 than its federal counterpart. 
The seminal case of Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), supports defendant's 
position. For Fourth Amendment protections to be triggered, there is "a twofold requirement, first 
that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the 
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.'" Katz at 361. Defendant did 
have an actual, subjective and reasonable expectation of privacy against police videotaping of his 
activities of daily living, including receiving guests at his front door and moving about in his yard. 
There can be no doubt that defendant would have been offended had he observed a police officer 
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observing him from a position across the street for a period of fifty-two straight hours. There 
likewise can be no doubt that defendant would have been offended had he known that a camera, in 
a house across the street, was surreptitiously recording what was happening on his property. As 
Judge McKay, writing for the majority in Mesa-Rincon, supra, at 1445, noted, the home is "the 
central bastion of privacy." Defendant, like all men and women who call themselves free, finds 
warrantless government video surveillance in and around private homes to be repugnant. 
Of special significance is the fact that, in this case, police located the camera inside another 
private home. The camera was not placed where all observers including police inherently had a right 
to be. Videotaping occurred from a non-public vantage point. As a result, this is not a situation 
where surveillance was in a public place, where people casually come and go and view activities. 
Defendant believes, therefore, that he also had an actual, subjective expectation of privacy against 
being videotaped by police for a prolonged period of time from a location where the general public 
did not have a right to be without permission. See State v. Thomas, 642 N.E.2d 240, 244-46 
(Ind.App. 1 Dist. 1994), in support. The reasonableness of a citizen's expectation of privacy does 
not depend merely upon whether he or she is inside or outside a home, or within or outside of public 
view. Other factors need to be considered. They include 'the surreptitious means by which ... 
surveillance was accomplished, including the location of the equipment and the method utilized to 
place it there, and ... the degree of intrusion inherent in the ... nature of... surveillance." Thomas at 
244. By these standards, defendant's expectation of privacy was violated by police. 
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Regarding the second prong in Katz, defendant believes further that his expectation of privacy 
is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Video surveillance, by its very nature, 
represents massive intrusion into the privacy and dignity of individuals. It is not an overreaction to 
think of and make reference to George Orwell's novel, 1984. Indeed the federal appeals courts in 
Torres, supra, and Cuevas-Sanchez, supra, drew comparisons between government surreptitious 
video surveillance and the world that Orwell described. In Torres the court acknowledged 
defendants' argument by stating, "Television surveillance in criminal investigations (other than of 
foreign agents) ... is in any event so intrusive—so reminiscent of the 'telescreens' by which 'Big 
Brother' in George Orwell's 1984 maintained visual surveillance of the entire population of 
'Oceania,' the miserable country depicted in that anti-utopian novel...." At 877. The court also 
observed, "But maybe in dealing with so intrusive a technique as television surveillance, other 
methods of control as well, such as banning the technique outright from use in the home in connection 
with minor crimes, will be required, in order to strike a proper balance between public safety and 
personal privacy." At 882. In Cuevas-Sanchez, a case, like this case, where there was monitoring 
of activity in a yard, the court noted, "This type of surveillance provokes an immediate visceral 
reaction: indiscriminate video surveillance raises the spectre of the Orwellian state." At 251. The 
court also was disturbed by the fact that the area under camera observation "fell within the curtilage 
of [Cuevas'] home, an area protected by traditional fourth amendment analysis." Id. Police 
videotaping, without limitation, has the potential to destroy a free society and create in its place a 
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police state. 
Defendant concedes that surreptitious video surveillance by police does not violate 
constitutional protections when, prior to surveillance, court authorization is properly obtained. 
Defendant in no way seeks to prevent police from investigating suspected criminal activity. However, 
on behalf of himself, as well as others in the future, defendant does desire that the Court impose a 
warrant requirement before the government installs and makes use of video cameras for surveillance 
purposes in and around private homes. Videotaping in such circumstances constitutes a search, and 
to quote Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481-82 (1963), there needs to be "the deliberate, 
impartial judgment of ajudicial officer... interposed between the citizen and the police...." Defendant 
in fact urges the Court to adopt all five requirements set forth in Mesa-Rincon, supra. These 
requirements, from the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, represent a well-struck balance between the 
needs of the government to investigate and prosecute criminal activity and the rights of the people 
to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. 
In this case, because of violation of the defendant's constitutional rights, the video that police 
obtained from surveillance on his home properly should be suppressed. 
II. EVIDENCE DISCOVERED IN DEFENDANT'S 
"TRASH BAGS" PROPERLY SHOULD BE 
SUPPRESSED. 
A. THE EVIDENCE IS FRUIT OF THE 
POISONOUS TREE; ATTENUATION 
ANALYSIS SUPPORTS SUPPRESSION; 
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FURTHER, THE EVIDENCE WAS 
HARMFUL TO DEFENDANT. 
While police were inside the home across the street from defendant's home for the purpose 
of retrieving video equipment, and while the equipment was still in operation, they observed 
defendant remove two "trash bags" from the back of a vehicle on his property and place the bags near 
the street. Tr. 7,1. 22 to Tr. 10,1. 2. Police decided to seize the bags but did not do so immediately. 
Rather, they went back four hours later, during the night. Tr. 10,11. 3-9. The bags were opened at 
police headquarters. Inside were bindles and straw portions with drug residue, along with drug 
paraphernalia. Tr. 11-17. Defendant, following preliminary hearing, moved to suppress evidence 
found in the bags. Two separate arguments were advanced: (1) Police searched and seized the bags 
without a warrant and without probable cause, and (2) evidence in the bags was fruit of the poisonous 
tree, that is, tainted from illegal surveillance on defendant's home. The trial court, in denying 
defendant's motion, disposed of the second argument implicitly not explicitly because it determined 
that surveillance on defendant's home did not violate any of his rights. In effect the court ruled that 
the bags were not fruit, tainted or otherwise, because there never was a poisonous tree. 
Defendant consequently requests that the Court remand to the trial court the issue of whether 
evidence found in the bags is fruit of the poisonous tree, assuming the Court agrees that warrantless, 
surreptitious police videotaping, in the facts and circumstances of this case, violated defendant's 
rights. In the alternative, defendant asks the Court to hold that evidence in the bags was tainted and 
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must be suppressed on the basis of the facts, supra, adduced at preliminary hearing. 
Whether derivative evidence should be suppressed is a matter for so-called attenuation 
analysis. Such analysis, in this jurisdiction, is in harmony with the seminal case of Brown v. Illinois, 
Ml U.S. 590 (1975). A line of cases, including State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990), State 
v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993) and State v. Shoulder blade, 905 P.2d 289 (Utah 1995), 
makes use of three factors to determine the admissibility of evidence obtained as a result of police 
misconduct. The factors are: (1) the temporal proximity between official misconduct and 
subsequently discovered evidence, (2) the purpose and flagrancy of official misconduct, and (3) the 
presence or absence of intervening circumstances. See, e.g., Shoulder blade, supra, at 292. 
In this case, there was no significant period of time between when police were engaged in 
illegal activity and when they seized the bags. Police saw defendant place bags near the street and 
just four hours later, under cover of darkness, they seized them. Next, the conduct of police was 
intentional. Videotaping of defendant's home was not accidental or serendipitous; police deliberately 
set up equipment inside a home across the street from defendant. Videotaping also had a purpose, 
to obtain evidence to prosecute and convict defendant if possible. The government may argue that 
police intended no violation of defendant's rights and in fact, because defendant is raising a novel 
issue, the law was unclear. "However, uncertainty in the law does not justify an encroachment upon 
Fourth Amendment guarantees. Allowing every ambiguity to be an exception to constitutional 
guarantees would eviscerate these very guarantees." Id. at 294. Defendant believes that, considered 
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objectively, police conduct was misguided and flagrant in the extreme. Finally, there really were no 
intervening events between police videotaping and seizure of the bags. Nothing happened. The 
posture of this case clearly would be different, if in the four hours available to them, police had 
applied for and obtained a warrant to search defendant's house and outside property. 
Defendant acknowledges that in addition to showing that the bags are fruit of the poisonous 
tree he must show that the bags, as evidence, were harmful to him at the trial court level. State v. 
Genovesi, 909 P.2d 916, 919 (Utah App. 1995). In this case, evidence in the bags was plainly 
damaging to defendant. Drug residue and drug paraphernalia were found by police. Also, 
defendant's conditional plea of no contest to Count I, possession of methamphetamine, a second 
degree felony, was based expressly on what was discovered in the bags. Plea and Sentencing Hearing 
Tr. 14,11.4-9. 
Defendant urges the Court to remand this issue to the trial court or hold itself that the bags 
are fruit of the poisonous tree on the basis of evidence already adduced. He believes that police 
surveillance on his home was an egregious violation of constitutional rights and must be deterred. 
Suppression of the bags as evidence against him would put the government on notice that surveillance 
generally must occur with judicial oversight and approval. Defendant agrees with the court's 
comments in Shoulder blade, supra, at 292 that "The incentive for engaging in unconstitutional 
conduct... can be removed by excluding evidence obtained from illegal seizures" (citing Mapp v. 
Ohio, supra, at 655 (1961)) and "Excluding such evidence prevents the courts from becoming a party 
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to wrongdoing and maintains public confidence in the integrity of governmental action" (citing Elkins 
v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960) and Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13 (1968)). 
B. POLICE HAD NO WAY OF KNOWING THAT 
THE "TRASH BAGS" CONTAINED GARBAGE; 
THIS CASE THEREFORE IS DISTINGUISHABLE 
FROM GREENWOOD AND JACKSON; EVEN IF 
THE BAGS ARE CONSIDERED TO BE 
GARBAGE, DEFENDANT HAD A REASONABLE 
EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN IT; UTAH 
SHOULD JOIN OTHER JURISDICTIONS, 
FOR UNIQUELY HISTORICAL REASONS, 
AND AFFORD CITIZENS AN EXPECTATION 
OF PRIVACY IN GARBAGE. 
Defendant, following preliminary hearing, also advanced the argument that police searched 
and seized the bags without a warrant and even without probable cause, in violation of defendant's 
rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 14 of the 
Utah Constitution. For purpose of federal analysis, defendant acknowledges that the controlling case 
is California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988). Greenwood holds that the Fourth Amendment does 
not prohibit the warrantless search and seizure of garbage left for collection outside the curtilage of 
a home. At 37. However, that case refers expressly to "garbage." In this case, police had no clear 
indication beforehand that the bags contained garbage. The bags were dark-colored and police were 
not able to see any contents by simply looking at them on the street. Preliminary Hearing Tr. 35,1. 
23 to Tr. 36,1. 9. Also, police never knew the origin of the bags, for example if they came from 
defendant's house, another person's house, or some completely different place. They only saw 
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defendant remove the bags from the back of a vehicle on his property. Tr. 9,11. 23-25. Police 
assumed that the bags were "trash bags," set out for garbage collection, but this was merely an 
assumption, not something that they knew as a certainty (or showed that they knew as a certainty at 
preliminary hearing). Arguably, the bags could have contained anything and, having been inside a 
vehicle, originated anywhere and been intended for any number of purposes other than garbage 
collection. It is irrelevant that the bags ultimately were found to contain garbage. "[A] search is not 
... made legal by what it turns up. In law it is good or bad when it starts and does not change 
character from its success." United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948). For these reasons, 
defendant believes that the facts in Greenwood and this case are distinguishable and he had in the bags 
an expectation of privacy which society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. 
Ten days after defendant filed the notice of appeal in this case, the Court decided State v. 
Jackson, P.2d , 315 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (Utah App. 1997). Jackson held, for the first time 
in this jurisdiction, that article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution does not prohibit the warrantless 
search of a citizen's garbage left for curbside collection. At 29. In response, defendant first points 
to different facts in this case. In Jackson, police searched garbage cans provided by Provo City and 
marked with the defendants' house number in white stenciled writing. As the Court noted, there was 
some indication that what police had before them were garbage cans, containing garbage meant for 
removal and belonging to residents in the house. At 26. Here, there were no garbage cans. There 
was nothing to corroborate that the bags that defendant placed near the street had garbage inside. 
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There was nothing to suggest that the bags contained his garbage. Defendant simply had in his 
possession property, the exact nature of which was unknown to police until after the fact. With 
respect to this property, defendant is entitled to as much protection against unreasonable searches 
under article I, section 14 as the Fourth Amendment. 
Even if the bags are considered to be garbage ready for collection, defendant, respectfully, 
disagrees with the holding of the Court in Jackson. Defendant believes that appellate courts in this 
jurisdiction should interpret article I, section 14 to give citizens a greater privacy interest in garbage 
than they currently have under the Fourth Amendment as interpreted by Greenwood. 
Three jurisdictions, admittedly a minority, have interpreted their state constitutions to raise 
the floor of protection afforded citizens in garbage searches such as in Greenwood. See State v. 
Hempele, 576 A.2d 793 (N.J. 1990); State v. Boland, 800 P.2d 1112 (Wash. 1990); and State v. 
Tanaka, 701 P.2d 1274 (Haw. 1985). Hempele is noteworthy because the court felt that the first 
requirement in the traditional Katz inquiry, whether a person has exhibited an actual (subjective) 
expectation of privacy, is irrelevant and arbitrary in extreme situations. At 801-02. One extreme 
situation is warrantless searches of citizens' garbage. Manifestation of an expectation of privacy in 
garbage is unnecessary because such expectation is inherently reasonable. "Undoubtedly many would 
be upset to see a neighbor or stranger sifting through their garbage, perusing their discarded mail, 
reading their bank statements, looking at their empty pharmaceutical bottles, and checking receipts 
to see what videotapes they rent. ...Given the secrets that refuse can disclose, it is reasonable for a 
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person to prefer that his or her garbage remain private." At 803. 
In Boland the court pointed to language in its state constitution that was broader than the 
Fourth Amendment. At 1115. However, underlying the court's decision, more fundamentally, was 
the recognition, "[AJverage persons would find it reasonable to believe the garbage they place in their 
trash cans will be protected from warrantless governmental intrusion." At 1116. In Tanaka the court 
observed, "People reasonably believe that police will not indiscriminately rummage through their trash 
bags to discover their personal effects. Business records, bills, correspondence, magazines, tax 
records, and other telltale refuse can reveal much about a person's activities, associations, and 
beliefs." At 1274. Indeed, as Justice Brennan noted in his vigorous dissent in Greenwood, "A single 
bag of trash testifies eloquently to the eating, reading, and recreational habits of the person who 
produced it. A search of trash, like a search of the bedroom, can relate intimate details about sexual 
practices, health, and personal hygiene. Like rifling through desk drawers or intercepting phone calls, 
rummaging through trash can divulge the target's financial and professional status, political affiliations 
and inclinations, private thoughts, personal relationships, and romantic interests. It cannot be doubted 
that a sealed trash bag harbors telling evidence of the 'intimate activity associated with the "sanctity 
of a man's home and the privacies of life,'" which the Fourth Amendment is designed to protect." 
At 50-51. 
Defendants in Jackson argued that Utah's unique history provides a basis for interpreting 
article I, section 14 more broadly than the Fourth Amendment with respect to searches of garbage. 
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At 28. The Court rejected defendants' argument; nonetheless defendant in this case finds it to be 
persuasive and wishes to join in it. The argument is especially apropos this year, 1997, the 
sesquicentennial of the Mormon pioneers' settlement of the Salt Lake Valley. Because of their 
religious practices and beliefs, in particular polygamy, these pioneers had suffered ridicule, 
persecution, mob violence and threats of extinction. Even after arriving in what now is Utah, they 
continued to be harassed by agents of the federal government due to passage of the Morrill Act of 
1862 and the Edmunds-Tucker Act of 1882. Homes were broken into and people and their papers 
and effects were searched and seized, all without the issuance of warrants. There can be no doubt 
that in 1895, when voters approved article I, section 14, and in 1896, when the Utah Constitution 
became effective with the admission of Utah into the United States, citizens had a heightened 
sensitivity to abuse by government agents in conducting searches and seizures and a concomitant 
heightened desire to curb such abuse then and in the future. There is, or should be, a logical link 
between the pioneer experience and contemporary notions about privacy, including privacy in trash. 
Defendant believes that Utah's settlers, if alive today, would consider warrantless government search 
of garbage to be offensive and intolerable, and precisely the kind of thing that article I, section 14 was 
intended to protect against. 
III. POLICE, ACTING IN BAD FAITH, FAILED TO 
PRESERVE POTENTIALLY USEFUL EVIDENCE 
IN THE BAGS FOR DEFENDANT; AS A RESULT, 
ALL EVIDENCE IN THE BAGS PROPERLY 
SHOULD BE SUPPRESSED. 
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Defendant thus far has offered the Court two bases for suppression of evidence discovered 
in the two bags that police took from outside his home: the evidence is fruit of the poisonous tree, 
and defendant had a privacy interest in the bags. A third basis for suppression stems from the fact 
that police violated defendant's due process rights by failing to preserve evidence in the bags that was 
potentially useful to him. 
At a special hearing held to consider the issue, it was adduced that police took the bags to 
police headquarters and began searching through contents at about 10:30 p.m. Police quickly 
separated "evidence" (bindles and straw portions with drug residue, along with drug paraphernalia) 
from what they considered to be "trash" (everything else in the bags). At about 11:00 p.m., just 
half an hour after beginning, police threw the "trash" away in a garbage dumpster at headquarters. 
Hearing Tr. 10-16. Among items found in the bags and thrown away was mail supposedly addressed 
to defendant. Either one piece or two pieces of mail were discovered; there was conflicting testimony 
on this point. However, police, at the hearing, could not recall the sender of the mail, the date that 
it was sent, or the nature of the contents. Tr. 19,11. 1-8; 21,11. 4-25; 33,11. 2-19. Also found were 
empty food cans and packages. Tr. 18,1. 24; 22,11. 15-19. When asked, police said that they made 
no effort to make a record of product dates or expiration dates on the food items. Tr. 24,11. 16-25. 
Defendant believes that police destroyed evidence potentially useful to him. The 
government's case against defendant partially depended on proving that, at the very least, he had 
constructive possession of the bags including their illegal contents. At issue, at trial, would have been 
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defendant's dominion and control over the bags. The one or two pieces of mail, at first glance, seem 
to inculpate defendant. However, if the mail was one or two years old, or it was addressed to 
someone else entirely, defendant could have argued that he had little or no recent dominion and 
control over the bags. The mail would have tended to exculpate defendant. For the same reason, old 
product or expiration dates on food cans and packaging materials found in the bags would have been 
helpful to defendant in his case. 
Defendant appears to raise yet another issue of first impression in this jurisdiction. The United 
States Supreme Court, however, has held that criminal defendants' due process rights under the 
Fourteenth Amendment are violated when police, acting in bad faith, fail to preserve potentially useful 
evidence. Arizona v. Youngblood, 4SS U.S. 51 (1988). 
The salient issue in Youngblood, as perhaps in this case, was police bad faith. Defendant 
concedes that there is no bright-line standard for showing of bad faith. He believes, however, that 
bad faith is apparent in the totality of facts and circumstances in this case. First, the burden of 
preservation was minimal. Police had the ability to make a detailed, itemized list of objects 
discovered in the bags. They chose not to do so. The main reason given was that preparing a list 
would take several hours. Tr. 19,11. 16-22; 25,11. 14-20. Police also had the means to photograph 
objects in the bags but did not. Tr. 19,11. 12-15; 25,1. 21 to 26,1. 1. This is bad faith by police. Cf 
United States v. Gibson, 963 F.2d 708, 711 (5th Cir. 1992), holding that the government does not act 
in bad faith when there is adequate documentation of destroyed evidence. Next, police deliberately 
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acted quickly. What they considered to be "trash" was placed in a dumpster only thirty minutes after 
search of the bags began. Tr. 16,11.2-4. The officers involved made no attempt, beforehand, to 
consult supervisors or check written police procedures. Tr. 16,1. 10 to 17,1. 10. Speed was the 
important thing, not defendant's possible rights. This is bad faith. Next, police knew or should have 
known that defendant specifically had a right to disclosure of physical evidence seized from him. Rule 
16, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Police frustration of this rule is bad faith. Next, police gave 
no innocent explanation of failure to preserve evidence, other than inexperience. Tr. 17,11. 14-21. 
Also, evidence disposed of, in particular mail and food, was central to the issue of defendant's 
constructive possession of the bags. This is bad faith. On these two points, see United States v. 
BohL 25 F.3d 904 (10th Cir. 1994). Finally, police who destroyed evidence in the bags are the same 
police who engaged in warrantless, surreptitious video surveillance on defendant's home and seized 
the bags without a warrant or even probable cause. There arguably is a pattern of police misconduct 
in this case, continuing through search of the bags at headquarters. 
At the conclusion of the special hearing defendant moved the trial court to suppress evidence 
in the bags on Youngblood grounds. The court denied defendant's motion. Defendant continues to 
believe that the evidence properly should be suppressed. He also believes, briefly, that article I, 
section 7 provides a basis on state constitutional grounds to find that suppression is appropriate given 
failure by police to preserve potentially useful evidence. Considerations of fundamental fairness 
dictate that defendants should have access to and independently be able to evaluate the usefulness of 
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all seized physical evidence, as opposed to police destroying select evidence based on assumptions 
about its value. See Thome v. Department of Public Safety, 114 P.2d 1326 (Alaska 1989), holding 
on state constitutional grounds that failure to preserve a videotape of a drunk driving suspect 
performing field sobriety tests violated due process. Thome also is remarkable for stating that police 
bad faith is not necessarily dispositive of whether a due process violation has occurred. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant prays that the Court hold that the trial court erred in not suppressing the police 
videotape obtained from warrantless, surreptitious surveillance on his home as well as all evidence 
improperly discovered in the two bags seized outside the home. Defendant prays further that the 
Court reverse defendant's conviction and remand his case for further proceedings by the trial court 
Such proceedings should include determination of whether evidence derived from the videotape 
and/or bags constitutes fruit of the poisonous tree and must be suppressed. 
DATED this ^ day of August, 1997. 
WESLEY M. BADEN 
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant 
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DISTRICT COURT 
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OCT 2 3 1996 
In The Eighth Judicial District Court Of Uintah County 
State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, 
vs. 
JOHN HOLDON, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant, 
RULING 
Case No. 951800369 
This matter comes before the Court on the Defendants Motion to Suppress. The 
Defendant first argues that the surveillance video tape of the Defendants home should be 
suppressed. The Court has read the cases sided by the Defendant and is not persuaded that the 
Defendant has a reasonable expectation of privacy which would require a warrant. The cases 
cited by the Defendant are factually distinguishable in that they relate to situations where the 
recordings where of areas that where not open to the public. In this case the police merely 
recorded on tape what was open to public view. The police certainly had a right to be in the 
place where the camera was set up. They could have stationed an officer at that location, 
where he or she could have observed the activities which took place at the Defendants home. 
The fact that a video recording was stationed at the location rather than a police officer has no 
constitutional significance. The use of recording equipment merely relieves an officer from 
' * & 
the substantial time commitment which would have been involved in having an officer 
personally observe the Defendants home. The constitution does not protect as private what a 
citizen knowingly opens to public view. Based upon the above, the Motion to Suppress the 
videotape is denied. 
The Defendant next argues that the police improperly collected evidence from the 
garbage bag which he had placed in front of his home for collection. The Defendant correctly 
sites California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988), as controlling. Nevertheless, the 
Defendant argues that an analysis under Article 1, Section 14, of the Utah State Constitution 
would lead to a different result than the result reached by the Supreme Court in Greenwood. 
For all practical purposes, the wording of Article 1, Section 14, and the 4th 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, is identical. The Defendant cites two other 
states who, in interpreting there own constitution, have granted greater privledges to their 
citizens. The Defendant argues that the views adopted by these states, in interpreting their 
own constitution, is more sound than the views expressed in Greenwood. When the language 
of a State Constitution is substantially identical to the corresponding portion of the Federal 
Constitution and the Defendant requests the Court to read the State Constitution more broadly 
than the Federal Constitution; the Defendant must examine the historical basis which would 
require a different reading. As indicated, the Defendant cites two states which have granted 
citizens greater rights under their constitutions with respect to garbage left for collection. 
However, the Defendant argument seems to rest upon the conclusion that the United States 
Supreme Court errored in deciding Greenwood. Unfortunately this court cannot presume that 
Greenwood was wrongly decided. Also, as noted by Justice Stewart in State v. Pool, 
871 P.2nd 531, the fact that a matter may have been wrongly decided, by itself, ..."does not 
justify resorting to Article 1, Section 14 to achieve a different result". In this case, the 
Defendant merely urges the Court to except the analyses used by these courts as being more 
sound than the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court. No attempt was made to 
specifically examine our Constitution and provide a basis as to why the Utah Constitution 
should be read more broadly. Absent this type of inquiry, the Court is not persuaded to rule 
that our Constitution is broader than the Federal Constitution. 
In reaching the above conclusion the Court notes that there is no argument which has 
been placed before the Court which would indicate that this is an area of law where there are 
conflicting decisions of the United States Supreme Courts which are confusing to judges and 
practioners. The decision in Greenwood applies to a narrow area of the law, it is clear, and 
easily applied. Based upon the foregoing, the Defendant Motion to Suppress is denied. 
DATED this 3->tiay of October, 1996. 
A. Lynn Payne 
District Court Judge 
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